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Abstract
Some domestic dogs learn to comprehend human words, although the nature and basis of this learning is unknown. In the
studies presented here we investigated whether dogs learn words through an understanding of referential actions by
humans rather than simple association. In three studies, each modelled on a study conducted with human infants, we
confronted four word-experienced dogs with situations involving no spatial-temporal contiguity between the word and the
referent; the only available cues were referential actions displaced in time from exposure to their referents. We found that
no dogs were able to reliably link an object with a label based on social-pragmatic cues alone in all the tests. However, one
dog did show skills in some tests, possibly indicating an ability to learn based on social-pragmatic cues.
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Introduction
Different animal species can be taught to respond in particular
ways to human words and other arbitrary symbols (e.g., African
Grey Parrots: [1]; dolphins: [2]; chimpanzees and bonobos: [3,4];
sea lions: [5]. However, the degree to which these behaviours
resemble human language learning and comprehension is a
difficult issue.
A species of particular interest in this regard is the domestic dog,
as dogs have evolved during the domestication process to use
human communication in special ways [6,7]. In a recent study
Kaminski, Call, and Fischer (2004) investigated the ability of a
Border Collie named Rico to link words with the objects to which
they referred (see also [8] for a similar study with another Border
Collie called Chaser). In this study the authors found that Rico was
indeed capable of linking roughly 200 labels to their referents.
Moreover, Rico was found to be able to learn new word-object
links through exclusion and, to some degree, to store this
knowledge in memory [9] see also [8]. This performance is
comparable to the fast mapping abilities only previously reported
for human children [10–12]. However, the question remains as to
how Rico, or any other dog, actually understands the word-object
relation [13,14]. One question is whether a dog would be able to
learn a word-object relation by using the referential behaviour of a
human speaker, which Rico’s behaviour would suggest, or whether
dogs are generally just able to form those links by blind association
based on spatial-temporal contiguity alone.
Children from the age of 18 months are able to infer the
meaning of words from certain social-pragmatic cues (e.g., [15–
17]. This enables them to form word-object relations in ways that
go beyond simply associating simultaneously present visual and
auditory stimuli. Children are thus able to use the referential intent
behind another individual’s utterances to form word-object
relations even without spatial-temporal contiguity between the
word and the referent, such as when an adult looks into an opaque
bucket and names an object which the child does not see until a
few moments later (e.g., [18–20]; see [21] for a review).
Understanding referential intentions independent of spatial-
temporal contiguity is often seen as crucial for the development
of a communication system consisting of arbitrary symbols, like
human language (e.g., [22]).
In recent years more and more evidence has emerged that dogs
are especially adapted to use human forms of communication,
especially human gestural communication. They seem to use
human referential behaviour (especially pointing, the archetype of
non-verbal reference; [23]) in a very flexible manner that cannot
be explained by low-level explanations such as local enhancement
(for an overview see [24]). That this seems to be a special
adaptation to human societies is supported by several facts. First,
in their ability to use human gestures, dogs outperform humans’
closest relative, the chimpanzee [25–27]. Also, dogs’ skills in this
domain do not seem to represent a general canid skill, since the
dog’s closest living relative, the wolf, is not as skilful at pointing as
dogs [26,28]. Finally, dogs’ skills do not seem to be the result of
extensive individual learning to follow cues during their ontogeny,
since puppies from a very young age already follow certain
gestures [26,29,30]. These findings suggest that a dog’s skill in
comprehending human communicative behaviour is a species-
specific adaptation for interacting effectively within human society
[7,28], developed during the process of domestication (see [31,32]
for a discussion of this hypothesis).
A recent study provides evidence that a dog’s understanding of
gestures is more flexible than previously thought. Kaminski,
Schulz, and Tomasello (2012) confronted dogs with a situation
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where a human intentionally gestured towards one of two cups in
order to indicate the location where a reward was hidden (e.g., by
pointing to it). In a control condition the human produced certain
unintended behaviours, directed at the target, which mirrored to
some extent the communicative gesture (for example, the human
held her arm in an outstretched position to check the time on her
watch). The dogs in this study followed the intended communi-
cative gesture but ignored the unintended behaviours [33]. In
another study [34] dogs were confronted with a task in which they
had to infer the intended referent of a human’s communicative act
via iconic signs – a totally novel situation for them. All dogs were
to some degree able to use the iconic signs, in most cases from the
beginning and without learning. Taken together these results
indicate that dogs may comprehend important aspects of human
communicative intentions.
However, so far we do not know how flexible this understanding
is and whether it relates to dogs’ ability to learn ‘‘words’’ (e.g.,
labels for objects). In the following studies we examined whether
dogs, specially trained to retrieve objects by their names, were able
to learn the labels for new objects in contexts during which there
was no spatial-temporal contiguity between the acoustic word and
the visual referent. Instead the dogs had to use the speaker’s
referential behaviour (e.g., pointing, gaze alternation) to infer the
referent, which was out of their view. In the first study (modelled
on [19]), one object was hidden in each of three buckets. Then the
human labelled one of the objects, still out of view of the dog, by
repeatedly directing her attention to the object in the bucket. After
labelling was complete, all objects were tipped out such that they
were in full view of the dog. However, now the human sat still and
did not refer to any of them. In the second study modelled on [15],
we confronted dogs with a situation in which they had to inhibit
any association of the word they heard with an object they saw, as
the human was in fact referring to a different object which only
she, the human, could see on her side of a barrier.
One constraint with the current study is that only four dogs
could be tested. This is because dogs with the skills needed for this
kind of study are extremely rare. The four dogs we worked with
have been taught numerous words by their owners – that is, taught
to fetch numerous different objects by name and have been shown
to be able to reliably do so under experimental conditions [35,36].
Experiment 1
Methods
The owners of the dogs were informed about each aspect of the
study and gave their permission for the different studies. The
studies presented here are not invasive. IRB approval was not
necessary for this kind of study because no special permission for
use of animals (dogs) in such socio-cognitive studies is required in
Germany, Austria or Switzerland. All procedures were performed
in full accordance with German, Austrian or Swiss legal
regulations and the guidelines for the treatment of animals in
behavioural research and teaching of the Association for the Study
of Animal Behaviour (ASAB).
The general procedure was based on studies conducted by
Tomasello and colleagues [19,20] with 18- and 24-month-old
children. The main goal of this first experiment was to see whether
dogs that were particularly skilful in learning labels for objects
would be able to learn a new label in non-associative contexts. To
test this we confronted dogs with a situation in which there was no
spatial-temporal contiguity between stimuli (seeing the object and
hearing its label), but rather the cues were referential-intentional
cues. To evaluate different complexity factors, when pre-testing
this study we ran a pilot phase during which we focussed on 3
slightly different versions of the experiment.
Subjects. The subjects were 4 domestic dogs (Betsy, a 4-year-
old female, Paddy, a 5-year-old male, Joey, a 4-year-old male and
Arco, a 5-year-old-male. All dogs were Border Collies.), who had
received special training in fetching items according to their labels
and were able to do so reliably under experimental conditions (for
Betsy and Paddy see [35,36], for Arco and Joey: unpublished data
). The procedure for testing these abilities in the different dogs was
based on the original procedure developed by Kaminski et al.
2004 [11]. All four dogs knew more than 30 objects by name,
which was the threshold for including them in this study. However,
the dogs’ label pools varied between 35 labels (Arco) and 230
labels (Betsy).
The owners of the dogs reported that the normal routine for
learning new object-label links involved the dogs interacting with
the objects whilst the owners constantly repeated the labels. All
four dogs live as pets with their owners.
Experimental set-up and general procedure. The appa-
ratus consisted of three identical opaque plastic buckets (37 cm
deep, 32 cm in diameter) fixed on a longitudinal wooden slat (see
figure 1). This allowed the buckets to be tilted simultaneously by
rotating the wooden slat. The distance between the buckets was
48 cm. The objects used were mainly dog and children’s toys, all
of which were unfamiliar to the test dogs.
The basic procedure was identical for all dogs. Both the
experimenter (E) and the owner (O) were present during testing.
Testing took place in two adjacent rooms in the dog owner’s
apartment. For each trial a new set of 3 toys was randomly selected
from an array of toys which were similar in size and material. Each
trial consisted of two phases. The label for a new toy was
introduced to the dog during the initial naming phase. The novel
labels were selected on the basis of their being as unfamiliar and as
phonologically distinctive from the previously known labels as
possible (see table 1 for examples). This means that we tried to
avoid introducing new labels which matched labels the dogs
already knew (e.g., introducing a new label ‘pig’ when the dog
already owned an object labelled ‘stick’). This phase was followed
by a retrieval phase during which the owner asked the dog to fetch
the object from an adjacent room and from three different objects
to see whether the dog had learnt the new labels.
During the naming phase O waited with the dog in the starting
room, while E set up the apparatus in the adjacent second room. E
placed one object in each of the three buckets, one of which was
the target object. The position of the target toy was counterbal-
anced across trials. The hiding process could not be observed by
the dog. After the hiding process was finished the owner and the
dog entered the testing room while E remained sitting still in a
predetermined position, about 2.5 metres behind the buckets,
facing the middle bucket. The dog could not see the objects in the
buckets at any time while entering. E then took over handling the
dog from O. While E held the dog on a lead the owner sat in a
predetermined position in the centre of the apparatus facing the
dog.
Pilot phase. During an initial pilot phase, the naming
procedure was different for each dog. This was to see which
procedure could be successful. In order to reduce the chances of
learning during this phase, not every procedure was used with
every dog.
Paddy. During naming of the target object, the owner
pointed at the target whilst saying, for example, ‘‘What a nice
xy!’’. The object remained in the bucket throughout, hidden from
the dog’s view. The naming of the new toy was repeated up to
seven times to ensure that the dog had enough exposure to the
Word-Learning in Dogs
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label. The owner ignored the other two buckets and hence the
other two objects. After naming was finished, the owner remained
still with a neutral body posture.
Joey & Arco. The naming period was similar to the above,
although now instead of the owner just focussing on the target
object and ignoring the contents of the other two buckets, the
buckets containing the non-target objects were onomatopoetically
treated by saying, ‘‘Ohh, ahh’’ (no words were used). The owner
directed her attention to each bucket one after the other, always
starting with the one on the left. The duration of attention towards
the bucket as well as intensity and intonation of vocalizations was
similar for both target and non-target buckets.
Betsy. Again the naming procedure was similar, but now the
owner’s behaviour towards the other two buckets was identical to
that towards the bucket containing the target object; however,
instead of labelling the objects inside, the owner simply said ‘‘Oh,
look, what a nice toy inside!’’ without stating a label. The owner
directed her attention towards each bucket, one after the other,
always starting with the one on the left. The duration of attention
towards the bucket as well as intensity and intonation of
vocalizations was similar for both target and non-target buckets.
After the naming was finished, O grabbed the slat with her
hands and simultaneously emptied the contents of all three buckets
by tilting the apparatus towards the dog. The dog remained in its
position next to E and was not allowed to touch the toys. Then O
put the toys back into the buckets from left to right and brought
the apparatus back into its upright position. The entire naming
procedure was repeated three times before the requesting phase
started. In this phase E placed all three toys (lined up in a straight
row, with the position of the target object randomized) in the
adjacent room while the owner and the dog remained in the initial
room. Having positioned the objects E joined the owner and the
dog in the other room and the owner then requested that the dog
retrieve the target toy using the new label introduced during step 1
(e.g., ‘‘Bring me the xy!’’). The dog could not see the owner or E
while searching for the requested item. If the dog retrieved the
correct item the owner rewarded the dog with play and/or food.
In cases in which the dog retrieved an incorrect object, i.e. an
object other than the target object, the owner reiterated her
command and let the dog search for the target once more. After
that the next trial started.
Dogs received a total of 24 trials of the respective version of this
pilot study and trials were conducted over six days, with four trials
per day. A total of 72 toys were randomly selected for each dog.
Toys were all similar in size and material and were randomly
grouped into 24 sets of three toys each.
Main experiment. After an initial analysis revealed that only
Paddy performed above chance (with chance being 0.33, see a
more detailed description of all results below) we conducted the
main experiment using the naming procedure used with Paddy on
all other dogs. This main experiment was conducted several weeks
after the initial study to ensure that there were no major carry-over
effects.
The procedure and number of trials were exactly the same as
described for Paddy in the pilot phase. The subjects were Betsy,
Joey and Arco.
Figure 1. Experimental set up during the naming phase of Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091014.g001
Table 1. Examples of labels introduced during Experiments 1 and 2.
Subject Study Label
Paddy 1 Gysi, Hot Dog, Gluehbirne, Bruno, Lumpi, Regenbogenhantel, Beetle,Quadratschaedel, Spirale, Muente
2 Heini, Spektrum, Snutig, Boomer, Harlikin, Moby Dick, Kilogramm, Petzi, Topolino, Neopren, Michael Jackson
Betsy 1 Niederoesterreich, Stechapfel, Alfons, Schrubka, Titifax, Columbus, Aristotoles, Klecksi, Propeller, Tantalus
2 Washington, Arabella, August, Miranda, Torpedo, Schokodrop, Heinzelmaennchen, Ikea, Knautschli, Rabe
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091014.t001
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Results
Statistical procedure. For statistical analysis of each dog’s
overall performance (both attempts for a given trial) we used a
Monte-Carlo simulation procedure [37]. For this we simulated
trials during which an individual randomly picked toys from a set
of available toys, one after the other and without replacement (i.e.
each choice reduced the number of toys available for the next
choice), until it retrieved the target toy (1 out of N). The number of
toys available at the beginning of a trial was the three objects
presented during the naming phase. We then ran as many trials as
the original subject(s), and calculated the average number of
attempts a subject needed to retrieve the target object (if at all). We
then repeated the entire process 10,000 times, in this way
generating the expected frequency distribution for the average
number of attempts after which the subject would bring the target
toys if choosing randomly. The real subjects, if they were using the
labels of the toys, should bring the target toy on average after
fewer attempts than in this expected (chance) distribution.
Significance was determined by calculating the proportion of
simulations in which the average number of attempts to fetch the
target object was as small as or smaller than for the real subject.
We also assessed each dog’s performances on the first attempts of
each trial, using a straightforward binomial procedure.
In the pilot phase chance expectation would be 0.33,
corresponding to the three objects presented. Paddy retrieved
the target object in 22 of the 24 trials (Monte-Carlo test, N
simulations = 10.000, P= 0.0073; see table 2). Reducing the data
to only his first attempts in each trial, he retrieved the target object
12 times, which is not significant (binomial test, P=0.126 (2-
tailed)). None of the other dogs performed above chance with
either statistical method (see table 2 for more detailed informa-
tion).
In the main experiment all dogs received the naming procedure
with which Paddy had been successful. Here the owner ignored
the non-target objects and exclusively directed her behaviour
towards the bucket which contained the target object. None of the
other dogs performed above chance with this procedure (see
table 2).
Discussion
This study has two main findings: First, as seen in literature on
animals but also in the developmental literature there seem to be
individual differences between subjects. While three dogs were not
at all able to use any aspect of the referential act to identify the
target object, one dog was able to use the referential act to identify
the task, even though the success rate was not overwhelming even
in this dog. This suggests that, while this skill could indeed be
within the species’ range, overall the task seemed fairly demanding
for the dogs. Even for the one dog, which was possibly able to link
the label and the object in the current situation, his performance
might have been simply due to a delayed association process
resulting from a local enhancement of one of the buckets and,
therefore, its contents. It could be that for the dog, the human’s
deictic behaviour did not refer to the object itself but rather to the
location, which was in consequence enhanced and might have
subsequently enhanced the object. In addition, assuming the dog
understood that the referential action of the human was directed
towards the object, the question remained whether he linked the
word with the object or just retrieved the object the human had
previously referred to.
In order to address this question we conducted a second
experiment with Paddy only since he was the only dog to have
been successful in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 Paddy showed that he was able to infer from
the human’s behaviour which object the human wanted him to
fetch. However, this does not necessarily mean that Paddy was
able to link the object with the label he had heard. The following
experiment was conducted to further test this. Now Paddy was
presented with two pairs of objects one after the other, with one
object from each pair being labelled. During the experimental
phase he then had to decide between both labelled objects upon
hearing the command to fetch one of the two. The labelling
procedure for each target object was identical to the procedure
used with Paddy in the previous study.
Methods
Subject. Paddy (see Experiment 1).
Experimental set-up and general procedure. A board was
used with two opaque buckets (the same buckets used in
Experiment 1) attached to it, fixed on a longitudinal wooden slat.
The distance between the buckets was 48 cm. A rack was also used
with an opaque and drawable curtain. As in Experiment 1 we used
children’s and dog toys that were unfamiliar to the dog.
Each trial consisted of a naming phase during which the labels
for target A and target B were introduced. This phase was followed
by a requesting phase during which one object was requested using
the label introduced just previously. During the naming phase the
labels (for target A and target B) were introduced while each target
object was paired with a distracter (distracter A and distracter B).
The general procedure was similar to Experiment 1. The owner
(O) sat behind the apparatus, with the dog sitting opposite and a
curtain covering the owner during the initial handling of the
objects. The owner placed both objects of a given pair into the
buckets (starting with the left-hand bucket). Then she opened the
curtain and labelled the target object repeatedly by looking back
Table 2. Dogs’ performance in Experiment 1 (Monte Carlo test N simulations = 10000; binomial test, chance level = .33).
First run Second run
Subject Correct retrievals overall Correct retrievals 1st attempt correct retrievals overall Correct retrievals 1st attempt
(Monte Carlo simulations) (binomial test) (Monte Carlo simulations) (binomial test)
Paddy 22 (p = .0073) 12 (p = .063)
Arco 15 (p = .4215) 11 (p = .132) 19 (p = .4452) 6 (p = .275)
Joey 17 (p = .3002) 10 (p = .243 19 (p = .0826) 11 (p = .132)
Betsy 17 (p = .1895) 11 (p = .132) 16 (p = .4417) 9 (p = .392)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091014.t002
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and forth between the respective bucket and the dog. Labelling
was repeated up to 4 times.
Afterwards the owner dumped both objects on the floor without
giving any directional cues whatsoever to any of the objects. After
5 seconds O closed the curtain again and continued by placing the
next pair of objects (A or B respectively) into the buckets; the
whole procedure was repeated. Each pair of objects was presented
4 times to the dog, always alternating between pair A and pair B.
The order of presentation in the labelling phase (target A and B
and the respective position) and the positions of the objects during
the requesting phase were semi-randomized, with the stipulation
that the same pair could not appear in more than 2 consecutive
trials, and counterbalanced.
In the requesting phase all four objects of both pairs were placed
in an adjacent room. Then the dog was requested to ‘‘Fetch target
A’’ or ‘‘Fetch target B’’ respectively. If the dog returned with the
correct object he was rewarded. If the dog returned with the
incorrect object, the owner took the object, put it away and the
trial ended. If the dog returned with no object, upon her return the
command was repeated and the dog was again send to the other
room.
Paddy received 24 trials during which a total of 48 labels were
introduced. After 13 trials Paddy showed signs of fatigue (e.g.,
constantly lying down, no response to commands) during the
naming phase, which is why we reduced the number of
introductions from 4 two 2 per pair.
Results
Paddy retrieved the correct object in only 7 out of 24 trials.
Assuming a chance level of 50% (corresponding to the two objects
that had been labelled) the dog’s performance was close to being
below chance level (binomial test, P=0.064, 2-tailed). Paddy
retrieved a labelled object, irrespective of whether it was the
correct one or not, in eleven out of 24 cases (binomial test,
P= 0.839, 2-tailed). When target A had been requested Paddy
correctly retrieved it in 6 out of 12 cases, but retrieved target B
correctly in only 1 out of 12 cases (x2 = 5.042, df = 1, P=0.025, 2-
tailed). When he brought an incorrect object, in 4 cases out of 17
this was the labelled non-target object, which was significantly
below chance expectation (binomial test, P=0.007, 2-tailed).
Discussion
Paddy’s behaviour in this study clearly shows that he was
struggling to link the word he heard with the specific object, as he
did not differentiate between the two different objects on the basis
of the newly learned labels. The comparison between both target
pairs suggests that Paddy memorized the labels for the target pair
which was introduced first better than those for the pair
introduced later. This could indicate that memorizing all labels
was simply too demanding. However, with the labels introduced
first in each trial Paddy’s success rate in fetching the target was also
not above chance level, indicating that he did not learn the labels
during the course of events. As Paddy’s success rate with retrieving
any labelled object (irrespective of whether it was the correct one
or not) was not above chance either, this is an indication that in
this experiment Paddy failed to use any of the human’s behaviour
as an indication that these objects were relevant. Taken together
this evidence supports the assumption that the current experiment
was too demanding for Paddy.
Experiment 3
Experiment 1 indicated that one dog might be able to link a
word with a particular object on the basis of social-communicative
cues given by a human. As the second experiment was probably
cognitively too difficult, we introduced a third experiment,
modelled on Baldwin, 1991, during which the dogs had visual
access to an object, but in some conditions that object was not the
referent of the human’s communication. To understand which
object the owner had in fact been referring to, in some trials the
dogs had to inhibit any association of the label with the object in
their view and instead link it with an object which was not in view
– as it was on the human’s side of an opaque barrier. Therefore,
associative learning based on the spatial-temporal contiguity
would lead to an actual error.
Methods
Subjects. The subjects were the same four domestic dogs who
participated in Experiment 1.
Experimental set-up and general procedure. The appa-
ratus consisted of an opaque barrier made of stiff cardboard
(33 cm651 cm) which occluded one of two objects. Again, the
objects were again dog and children’s toys unfamiliar to the test
dogs. During the experimental phase one object was placed behind
the barrier while one lay out in the open in full view. The distance
between the objects was 45 cm (see figure 2).
As in Experiment 1 the experimenter (E) and the owner
participated in the testing procedure. The testing took place in the
same rooms as in Experiment 1. A total of 56 toys were randomly
grouped into 28 sets of 2 toys. The stipulation for finding object
pairs was that objects had to be similar in size and material. In the
experimental phase each dog received a total of 28 trials. Dogs
were tested on seven different days, with four trials a day. A new
set of two toys was used for each trial. As in Experiment 1 the
procedure of the experimental phase consisted of an initial naming
phase followed by a requesting phase. Again novel labels were
selected on the basis that they were unfamiliar to the dogs and
phonologically distinctive from the previously known labels (see
table 1 for examples).
Before the naming phase, the owner waited with the dog in one
room while E set up the apparatus in the adjacent second room.
He placed two of the toys on the floor and set up the barrier in
front of one of them. The hiding process could not be observed by
the dog. After the hiding process E sat in a predetermined position,
approximately 2.5 metres from the apparatus, facing its centre.
Then the owner and the dog entered the testing room in such a
way that the dog could briefly see both toys. This was done to
ensure that the dog was aware that an object had been placed
behind the barrier. The owner guided the dog to where E was
sitting so that E could hold on to it: From this position, the dog was
no longer able to see the object behind the barrier. The owner sat
in a predetermined position behind both objects, opposite the dog.
During the naming phase, the owner pointed and gazed at one
of the toys and named it up to 7 times with a word unfamiliar to
the dog (e.g., ‘‘Look, that is the xy.’’). Throughout the naming
process, the dog remained in its position next to E and was not
allowed to touch the toys. In half of the trials the owner directed
her attention to the object visible to both her and the dog. In the
other half of the trials, the owner directed her attention to the
object which was only visible to her and not the dog. The position
of the barrier as well as the type of trial was randomized and
counterbalanced across trials.
After the naming process was complete the owner came to E’s
side and held on to the dog while E grabbed both toys (such that
they were unseen by the dog) and placed them in the adjacent
room. The experimenter then returned to the owner and dog in
the first room and the owner now requested that the dog fetch an
object using the label introduced in the naming phase. If the dog
Word-Learning in Dogs
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retrieved the correct object it was rewarded with food and/or play.
The position of the target object was counterbalanced and
randomized. To analyse the data we looked at overall perfor-
mance as well as both conditions separately.
Results
In this experiment chance expectation would be 0.5, corre-
sponding to the two objects presented. Overall, Paddy retrieved
the target object in 18 out of 28 trials (binomial test, P= 0.185, 2-
tailed). This is irrespective of condition (target in the open vs.
target behind barrier) as Paddy chose randomly regardless of
whether the target was out in the open or behind the barrier (9 out
of 14 trials; binomial test, P= 0.424, 2-tailed). However, Paddy
may have learned a strategy during the study because if we
compare the last 12 trials of the study to the first 12 trials it seems
that Paddy learned to select the target (first 12 trials: correct
retrieval in 6 out of 12 times, binomial test, P= 1.0; last 12 trials:
correct retrieval in 10 out of 12 times, binomial test, P= 0.039, 2-
tailed). Note that it was not the case that Paddy was using an
associative strategy in the first 12 trials, which he then switched. In
the first 12 trials he chose randomly; so in no phase of the
experiment did he use an associative strategy. The most plausible
hypothesis is that with more experience, Paddy was able to deal
with the unusual context and to learn the label for the object on
the basis of the referential cues in the situation.
The behaviour of the second dog, Betsy, looked somewhat
different. Betsy correctly retrieved the named toy in 17 out of 28
trials (binomial test, P= 0.345, 2-tailed). In the condition where the
owner named the occluded object Betsy retrieved the target object
in 6 out of 14 trials (binomial test, P= 0.791, 2-tailed). However, in
the condition where the object which was out in the open was
named Betsy retrieved the target object in 11 out of 14 trials,
which was marginally significant (binomial test, P=0.057, 2-
tailed). In contrast to Paddy she did not improve her performance
over trials (in both the first and the last 12 trials she correctly
retrieved 7 objects, binomial test, P= 0.774, 2-tailed). However,
she did not have a general preference for the object in the open, as
overall she chose it in 19 out of 28 cases (binomial test, P= 0.087).
This speaks against a strategy of generally mapping the word to
the visible object, and thus against a word-object mapping based
on the spatial-temporal contiguity of the two stimuli. Instead it
seems to suggest that the failures are due to the complexity of the
task. Betsy’s better performance when the object left in the open
was named might therefore be due to the less challenging
requirements in this condition, as the target object is more salient
and memorable.
The performance of Joey and Arco is comparable to that of
Betsy, with the difference that their performance did not even
reach a level close to significance. Joey retrieved the correct object
in eleven out of 28 cases (binomial test, P=0.345, 2-tailed) and
Arco in 15 out of 28 trials (binomial test, P=0.851, 2-tailed).
When asked to retrieve an object which was named in the open,
Joey chose the correct one in four out of 14 cases (binomial test,
P= 0.180, 2-tailed) and Arco in nine out of 14 cases (binomial test,
P= 0.424, 2-tailed). Joey correctly retrieved the object which was
named when placed behind the barrier in seven out of 14 cases
(binomial test, P= 1.000, 2-tailed), and Arco in six out of 14 cases
(binomial test, P= 0.791, 2-tailed). Furthermore, both dogs did not
improve their performance, as it was identical in the first and in
the last twelve trials; Joey retrieved the correct object four times
(binomial test, P= 0.388, 2-tailed), and Arco seven times (binomial
test, P= 0.774, 2-tailed).
Like Betsy they did not have a general preference for the object
in the open. Arco chose the object which was presented in the
open during the naming phase in 17 out of 28 trials, and Joey in
eleven out of 28 (binomial test, for both dogs P= 0.345, 2-tailed).
Discussion
These results show that three of the tested dogs made no object-
word links in any of the conditions. Strangely, they did not even
make object-word links in those conditions where there was the
potential for associative learning. This could suggest that for most
of the tested dogs the situation was cognitively too demanding.
One exception was Paddy, who showed some ability to link the
label with the object based on E’s referential behaviour when it
competed with simple association – though he needed some
experience with the paradigm to be able to do so as this ability
only appeared towards the end of the study.
Figure 2. Experimental setting of Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091014.g002
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General Discussion
In sum, the dogs in the current studies were not able to make
object-word links in the different contexts we provided. This could
be evidence that making object-word links outside an associative
context is simply too difficult a task for dogs. Strangely, the dogs
did not make object-word links when the condition gave room for
simple association either, indicating that the paradigms were
probably generally too demanding for the dogs. One exception
was Paddy, who performed well in parts of the studies presented.
In the first experiment phase of Experiment 1 Paddy seemed to
link a new word to an absent object based on the referential
behaviour of a human. However, his performance in the second
phase of Experiment 1 suggests that he might actually not have
linked the word he heard with the specific object but instead – and
most likely – linked the human’s general referential behaviour with
the target object. This is interesting because, in the second study,
there was some evidence that Paddy was actually able to do so
when he had to inhibit any association of the human’s referential
behaviour with an object in view. Paddy’s behaviour therefore
indicates that he was to some extent able to use a human’s
referential behaviour as a cue towards a specific, absent referent.
Human children use indexical, referential information which
refers to absent entities, a skill absent in our closest living relatives,
the chimpanzees [38]. Understanding referential cues toward
absent entities is seen as a significant skill in the context of human
language acquisition. (e.g., [22,39]. It opens up the possibility of
learning word-object relations outside the boundaries of spatio-
temporal contiguity, therefore facilitating the learning of a nearly
unlimited spectrum of word-object relations.
However, given the dogs’ limited skills in the studies presented
here it is as yet unclear whether understanding a reference towards
an absent referent is truly within dogs’ cognitive abilities. Even
though Paddy showed some choice strategies, which suggests that
he may have understood this concept, the question remains as to
why he failed in forming object-label links when confronted with
two objects at once. It could be that learning two labels at the same
time is cognitively too demanding for a dog (see [40] for evidence
that a label-trained dog can struggle with even easier versions of
this experiment). It could also be that Paddy’s behaviour in the
current task means that dogs correctly interpret referential
behaviour as being about something but that they cannot link the
spoken word to the object while doing so. Several studies have
already shown that dogs are good at interpreting a human’s
referential behaviour [33,41]. Paddy’s behaviour could therefore
be the first evidence to date that a dog attends to the referential
aspects of humans’ communicative behaviour in situations in
which reference is made to an absent object.
However, the question remains as to why the other three dogs
struggled with all versions of the current studies and why the dogs
performed so poorly overall in the different tasks. Kaminski et al.
(2004) showed that the Border Collie Rico could learn a word-
object link through exclusion and when no spatiotemporal
contiguity between the word and the referent was given. This
shows that this skill should be within the species’ range, although it
could be that it is a skill that pushes the boundaries of what dogs
are cognitively capable of, which is why major individual
differences occur. What is more, the experimental settings of the
current studies were probably especially challenging for the dogs
given that these kinds of tasks are normally quite novel for dogs
even if they have experience with objects being labelled. As
reported by the owners of the different dogs, the usual procedure
for learning word-object links is that the new label is constantly
repeated while allowing the dog to play with the new object.
Paddy’s behaviour does however leave room for the possibility that
dogs can learn label-object relations through human referential
communication and when no spatiotemporal contiguity is given.
Future studies which are cognitively less demanding will need to
investigate this further.
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